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Abstract
This paper studies that how an uncertain event can be
outlined as an approximate common knowledge. By re-
placing “know” with “know with certainty α” in standard
definitions of common knowledge, approximate common
knowledge with some certainty, defined iteratively and
mutually, iteratively known and mutually known with
some certainty, are explored. Examples are constructed
to show that an event which is not common knowledge
can be analyzed as an approximate common knowledge
with some certainty. An application in the principal-agent
model is investigated to show that approximate common
knowledge based on uncertain measure can be applied to
improve the behavior of an economic model.
Keywords: Common knowledge; Iteratively known;
Mutually known; Uncertain event; Uncertain measure;
Principal-agent model
1 Introduction
Common knowledge is of some interest in areas such
as game theory [3, 12] and the economics of informa-
tion [4], where people’s beliefs about each other’s beliefs
are of importance. Lewis [5] gave a definition of com-
mon knowledge that an event is common knowledge if
everyone knows it, everyone knows that everyone knows
it, and so on. Common knowledge can also be defined it-
eratively [1]: “Suppose that there are two players, 1 and
2. When we say that an event is common knowledge, we
mean more than just that both 1 and 2 know it; we also re-
quire that 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows
it, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on.”
Since strict common knowledge is almost impossible,
Monderer and Samet [8] considered a method to approx-
imate common knowledge by common belief. Morris [9]
replaced “knowledge” by “belief with probability p” in
standard definitions of common knowledge and demon-
strated the difference between this approximate common
knowledge and common knowledge when there are two
players. Approximate common knowledge was also stud-
ied by many researchers, such as Brandenburger and
∗Corresponding author. Tel: +86 02281333521. E-mail address:
tang@tju.edu.cn (W. Tang).
Dekel [2] and Morris and Shin [10]. However, those lit-
eratures mentioned above featured approximate common
knowledge in probabilistic terms. By contrast, a non-
probabilistic model is developed in this paper.
In many situations, for events which are static not
stochastic, players may not have full information about
them because of lacking the ability to observe. Therefore,
they may have different knowledge about them. For in-
stance, consider the wealth of Bill Gates at this moment.
It is difficult for us to form common knowledge about his
true wealth. Someone may think “his wealth is greater
than $3 billion”, while others consider that “it is greater
than $2 billion”. But we all know that “Bill is wealthy”,
which is vague but an approximate common knowledge
with high certainty. In a principal-agent model [4], the
type of an agent, such as the efficiency of a firm or the
ability of a labor, is assumed as the agent’s private value.
Since these notions are vague, the agents can’t know them
exactly, and the principal can’t be in sheer ignorance of
the matter. Thus it’s more reasonable to be outlined in an
uncertain sense, and then the principal and the agent can
form an approximate common knowledge about the value
of the agent’s type. With this in mind, the principal can
design a more effective contract.
Randomness is a basic type of objective uncertainty,
while fuzziness is a basic type of subjective uncertainty.
Probability theory and credibility theory [6] are branches
of mathematics for studying the behavior of random phe-
nomena and fuzzy phenomena, respectively. When the
uncertainty behaves neither randomness nor fuzziness, un-
certain measure was initialized by Liu [7] to deal with
it. In order to develop a theory of uncertain measure,
Liu [7] founded an uncertainty theory, which is a branch
of mathematics based on normality, monotonicity, self-
duality, countable subadditivity, and product measure ax-
ioms. This paper studies that how an uncertain event can
be analyzed as an approximate common knowledge based
on uncertain measure. It is worth to noting that the proba-
bility measure and the credibility measure, which are ba-
sic concepts under probability theory and credibility the-
ory respectively, are special kinds of uncertain measure.
Thus, the main contribution of this paper to these existing
literatures is that the approximate common knowledge is
outlined in a more general situation.
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The remain of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the uncertain measure and conditional uncer-
tain measure are introduced. In Section 3, approximate
common knowledge with some certainty is defined itera-
tively and mutually, respectively. Some properties and re-
lations of these definitions are investigated. Examples are
constructed to show that an uncertain event, which is not
common knowledge, can be analyzed as an approximate
common knowledge based on uncertain measure. In Sec-
tion 4, an application in a principal-agent problem is in-
vestigated to show that this approximate common knowl-
edge can be applied to improve the behavior of an eco-
nomic model when requiring lower certainty. Section 5
makes a conclusion.
2 Basic Concepts
Given a universe Γ, L is a σ-algebra over Γ. Each element
Λ ∈ L is called an event. An uncertain measure M :
L → [0, 1], is a set function defined on L, and it satisfies
the following conditions [7].
Axiom 1. (Normality) M{Γ} = 1.
Axiom 2. (Monotonicity) M{Λ1} ≤ M{Λ2} whenever
Λ1 ⊂ Λ2.
Axiom 3. (Self-Duality) M{Λ} + M{Λc} = 1 for any
event Λ.
Axiom 4. (Countable Subadditivity) For every countable










The following examples are introduced by Liu [7] to
illustrate the uncertain measure.
Example 2.1. Let Γ = {γ1, γ2, γ3}. For this case, there
are only 8 events. Define
M{γ1} = 0.6, M{γ2} = 0.3, M{γ3} = 0.2,
M{γ1, γ2} = 0.8, M{γ1, γ3} = 0.7, M{γ2, γ3} = 0.4,
M{φ} = 0, M{Γ} = 1.
Then M is an uncertain measure because it satisfies the
four axioms.
Example 2.2. Suppose that λ(x) is a nonnegative func-
tion on < satisfying
sup
x6=y
(λ(x) + λ(y)) = 1. (1)














is an uncertain measure on <.
Example 2.3. Suppose ρ(x) is a nonnegative and inte-























is an uncertain measure on <.
Example 2.4. Suppose that λ(x) is a nonnegative func-














































is an uncertain measure on <.
For any uncertain measure M, we have the following
propositions.
Proposition 2.1. [7] Suppose that M is an uncertain
measure. Then
(1) M{φ} = 0 and 0 ≤M{Λ} ≤ 1 for any event Λ.
(2) M{Λ1} ∨ M{Λ2} ≤ M{Λ1 ∪ Λ2} ≤ M{Λ1} +
M{Λ2} for any events Λ1 and Λ2.
(3) M{Λ1}+M{Λ2}−1 ≤M{Λ1∩Λ2} ≤ M{Λ1}∧
M{Λ2} for any events Λ1 and Λ2.
Proposition 2.2. [7] Let Γ = {γ1, γ2, . . .}. If M is an
uncertain measure, then




for any i and j.
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Definition 2.1. [7] Let Γ be a nonempty set, L a σ-
algebra over Γ, and M an uncertain measure. Then the
triplet (Γ,L,M) is called an uncertainty space.
Definition 2.2. [7] An uncertain variable is a measurable
function ξ from an uncertainty space (Γ,L,M) to the set
of real numbers, i.e., for any Borel set B of real numbers,
the set
{ξ ∈ B} = {γ ∈ Γ | ξ(γ) ∈ B}
is an event.
Definition 2.3. [7] The uncertainty distribution Φ : < →
[0, 1] of an uncertain variable ξ is defined by
Φ(x) = M{ξ ≤ x}.
Definition 2.4. [7] Let ξ be an uncertain variable. Then








provided that at least one of the two integrals is finite.
Under an uncertain environment, the certainty of an
event A after it has been learned that some other event B
has occurred can be measured by conditional uncertain
measure [7], which is defined formally as follows.
Definition 2.5. [7] Let (Γ,L,M) be an uncertainty
space, and A,B ∈ L. Then the conditional uncertain















provided that M{B} > 0.
Proposition 2.3. [7] Let (Γ,L,M) be an uncertainty
space, and B an event with M{B} > 0. Then the con-
ditional measure M{·|B} is an uncertain measure, and
(Γ,L,M{·|B}) is an uncertainty space.
Definition 2.6. [7] Let ξ be an uncertain variable on
(Γ,L,M). A conditional uncertain variable of ξ given
B is a measurable function ξ|B from the conditional un-
certainty space (Γ,L,M{·|B}) to the set of real numbers
such that
ξ|B(γ) ≡ ξ(γ), ∀γ ∈ Γ.
Definition 2.7. [7] Let ξ be an uncertain variable. Then








provided that at least one of the two integrals is finite.
3 Uncertain Event as an Approximate Com-
mon Knowledge
Consider the case that there are two players, 1 and 2. Let
Γ be the set of states of the world, L a σ-algebra over Γ.
Then each element A ∈ L is referred as an event. An
uncertain measure M is defined on L such that for each
event A, M{A} denotes the certainty that the true state is
in A. Then the triplet (Γ,L,M) is an uncertainty space.
Without loss of generality, any state in Γ should be true
with a positive certainty, i.e., M{γ} > 0 for each γ ∈ Γ.
3.1 Information partitions and common knowledge
For player i ∈ {1, 2}, the information structure of his
knowledge about the true state of the world is a partition
of Γ, denoted by Qi. For any event A,B ∈ Qi, we have
A ∩ B = φ and ∪Aj∈QiAj = Γ. For each γ ∈ Γ, let
the symbol Pi(γ) denote the element of Qi that contains
γ. Therefore, if γ ∈ Γ is the true state of the world, then
Pi(γ) is the event which can be observed by player i ac-
cording to his information structure.
Definition 3.1. [11] For the partitions Q1 and Q2, their
meet, denoted by Q1 ∧ Q2, is the finest partition that is
coarser than any of the partitions Q1 and Q2.
Definition 3.2. [11] For the partitions Q1 and Q2, their
join, denoted by Q1 ∨ Q2, is the coarsest partition that is
finer than any of the partitions Q1 and Q2.
If γ is the true state of nature and the player 1 and 2
are willing and able to cooperate, then they learn that the
element of their join Q1 ∨ Q2 containing γ has occurred,
and this is the most exact information they can learn from
each other [11].
Definition 3.3. [1] Given γ ∈ Γ, an event A is said to
be common knowledge at γ if and only if A includes the
member of Q1 ∧Q2 that contains γ.
Let CK(γ) denote the set of events which are common
knowledge at γ, and CKA denote the set of states at which
A is common knowledge, i.e., CKA = {γ | A ∈ CK(γ)}.
The notations can be demonstrated through the following
example.
Example 3.1. Consider a principal-agent model [4],
where there are two players, the principal and the agent,
denoted by player 1 and 2 respectively. Let γ denote the
efficiency of the agent and the set of all the possible values
of γ be denoted by Γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . , γ11}, where γ1 means
the least efficient, γ11 is the most efficient and γi is more
efficient than γj for all i > j. Assume that the principal
only knows that the agent is “less efficient”, “efficient” or
“very efficient” corresponding to that γ is in {γ1, γ2, γ3},
{γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7} or {γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}, respectively. Thus,
Q1 = {{γ1, γ2, γ3}, {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7}, {γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}}.
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The agent has more information about his/her own type
than the principal, thus Q1 is coarser than Q2. Without
loss of generality, assume that
Q2 = {{γ1}, {γ2, γ3}, {γ4, γ5, γ6}, {γ7, γ8}, {γ9, γ10, γ11}}.
By Definition 3.1 and 3.2, Q1 ∧ Q2 =
{{γ1, γ2, γ3}, {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}} and
Q1 ∨Q2 = {{γ1}, {γ2, γ3}, {γ4, γ5, γ6}, {γ7},
{γ8}, {γ9, γ10, γ11}}. It follows from Definition 3.3 and
Q1 ∧Q2 that, for each state γ, the set of events which are





{A | {γ1, γ2, γ3} ⊆ A} ,
if γ ∈ {γ1, γ2, γ3}
{A | {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11} ⊆ A} ,
if γ ∈ {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}.
Specifically, {γ1, γ2, γ3} ∈ CK(γ) for γ ∈
{γ1, γ2, γ3}; and {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11} ∈
CK(γ) for γ ∈ {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}. There-
fore, “the agent is less efficient” is common knowl-
edge at γ ∈ {γ1, γ2, γ3} and “the agent is effi-
cient or very efficient” is common knowledge at γ ∈
{γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}.
Furthermore, for the uncertain events B =
{γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7} and C = {γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}, CKB =
CKC = φ, which means that “the agent is efficient” can
not be common knowledge, neither is “the agent is very
efficient”. In the following subsections, we can view that
B and C are approximate common knowledge based on
uncertain measure.
3.2 Iteratively known with some certainty
Given a true sate γ, let Pi(γ) ∈ Qi be the event ob-
served by player i. Then the conditional uncertain mea-
sure of A ∈ L for player i at state γ is M{A|Pi(γ)}, i.e.,
player i knows that the event A happens with certainty
M{A|Pi(γ)} given the true state γ.
Definition 3.4. Say that player i α-knows A at state γ
if the conditional certain measure of A given Pi(γ), is at
least α. Writing Kαi A for the set of states at which player
i α-knows A, then Kαi A ≡ {γ | M{A|Pi(γ)} ≥ α}.
Proposition 3.1. For any α, β ∈ (0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2} and
A,B ∈ L,
(1) if A ∈ Q1 ∧Q2, then K1i A = A;
(2) if α ≥ β > 0, then Kαi A ⊆ Kβi A;
(3) if A ⊆ B, then Kαi A ⊆ Kαi B.
Proof. (1) Since K1i A = {γ | M{A|Pi(γ)} ≥ 1} =
{γ | M{A|Pi(γ)} = 1}, then for all γ ∈ K1i A, Pi(γ) ⊆
A and K1i A ⊆
⋃
γ∈K1i A Pi(γ) ⊆ E. For any γ ∈ A,
since A ∈ Q1 ∧ Q2, then Pi(γ) ⊆ A, which implies
M{A|Pi(γ)} = 1 and γ ∈ K1i A. Thus, A ⊆ K1i A. So
K1i A = A.
(2) If Kαi A = φ then the result is obvious, else for
any γ ∈ Kαi A, M{A|Pi(γ)} ≥ α. Since α ≥ β, thus
M{A|Pi(γ)} ≥ β, which means that γ ∈ Kβi A. So
Kαi A ⊆ Kβi A.
(3) For any γ ∈ Kαi A, M{A | Pi(γ)} ≥ α. Since
A ⊆ B, thus M{B|Pi(γ)} ≥ M{A|Pi(γ)}, which
means that γ ∈ Kαi B. So Kαi A ⊆ Kαi B.
Player 1 iteratively knows that event A happens with
certainty α if 1 α-knows it, 1 α-knows that 2 α-knows it,




i A = {γ | M{Kαi A|Pj(γ)} ≥ α} (3)
denote the states where player j α-knows that player i α-
knows A. Writing IKαi A for the set of states where player
i iteratively knows that event A happens with certainty α,
then
IKα1 A ≡ Kα1 A ∩Kα1 Kα2 A ∩Kα1 Kα2 Kα1 A ∩ · · · (4)
IKα2 A ≡ Kα2 A ∩Kα2 Kα1 A ∩Kα2 Kα1 Kα2 A ∩ · · · (5)
Definition 3.5. Event A is iteratively known with cer-
tainty α if both players iteratively know it with certainty
α. Thus A is iteratively known with certainty α at state γ
if γ ∈ IKαA ≡ IKα1 A ∩ IKα2 A.
Proposition 3.2. For any α, β ∈ (0, 1] and A,B ∈ L,
IKαA satisfies that
(1) if A ∈ Q1 ∧Q2, then IK1A = A;
(2) if α ≥ β > 0, then IKαA ⊆ IKβA;
(3) if A ⊆ B, then IKαA ⊆ IKαB.
Proof. (1) Since A ∈ Q1 ∧ Q2, it follows from Propo-
sition 3.1 that K1i A = A for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus,
from the definition of IKαA, it can immediately draw that
IK1A = A.
(2) If α ≥ β, it follows from Proposition 3.1
that Kαi A ⊆ Kβi A for all i ∈ {1, 2}. We first
show that IKα1 A ⊆ IKβ1A. Obviously, Kα1 Kα2 A ⊆
Kα1 K
β













































Kβ2A, for all i =
0, 1, 2, . . . Thus, IKα1 A ⊆ IKβ1A. Similarly, IKα2 A ⊆
IKβ2A. Therefore, IK
αA ⊆ IKβA.
(3) If A ⊆ B, it follows from Proposition 3.1 that
Kαi A ⊆ Kαi B for all i ∈ {1, 2}. We first show
that IKα1 A ⊆ IKα1 B. It is obviously that Kα1 Kα2 A ⊆
Kα1 K
α






















A ⊆ Kα1 [Kα2 Kα1 ]n B and
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n Kα2 A ⊆ Kα1 [Kα2 Kα1 ]n Kα2 B, for all n =
0, 1, 2, . . . Thus, IKα1 A ⊆ IKα1 B. Similarly, IKα2 A ⊆
IKα2 B. Finally, IK
αA ⊆ IKαB.
Let IKα(γ) denote the set of events which are iter-
atively known with certainty α at γ. Then IKα(γ) ≡
{A | γ ∈ IKαA} , which satisfies the following proper-
ties.
Proposition 3.3. For any γ ∈ Γ and α, β ∈ (0, 1],
(1) if A ∈ IKα(γ) and A ⊆ B, then B ∈ IKα(γ);
(2) if α ≥ β > 0, then IKα(γ) ⊆ IKβ(γ).
Proof. (1) Since A ∈ IKα(γ) then γ ∈ IKαA. Since A ⊆
B, it follows from Proposition 3.2 that IKαA ⊆ IKαB,
which implies that γ ∈ IKαB and B ∈ IKα(γ).
(2) For any C ∈ IKα(γ), γ ∈ IKαC. Since α ≥
β, it follows from Proposition 3.2 that IKαC ⊆ IKβC.
Thus, γ ∈ IKβC and C ∈ IKβ(γ). Finally, IKα(γ) ⊆
IKβ(γ).
Example 3.2. Consider the principal-agent model de-
scribed in Example 3.1. Let λ(γ) be a nonnegative func-
tion depicted in Table 1. It is easy to verify that λ(γ) sat-
Table 1: The value of the function λ(γ)
γ γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5
λ(γ) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
γ6 γ7 γ8 γ9 γ10 γ11
λ(γ) 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
isfies Equation (1). Let L be the power set of Γ. Then
an uncertain measureM can be constructed according to
Equation (2) and the triplet (Γ,L,M) is an uncertainty
space. Consider the event B = {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7}. For any
α ∈ (0.5, 1], since
M{B|P1(γ)} =
{







1, if γ ∈ {γ4, γ5, γ6}
0.5, if γ ∈ {γ7, γ8}
0, otherwise,
then Kα1 B = {γ | M{B|P1(γ)} ≥ α} = B and Kα2 B =
{γ | M{B|P2(γ)} ≥ α} = {γ4, γ5, γ6}. Since
M{Kα2 B|P1(γ)} = M{{γ4, γ5, γ6}|P1(γ)}
=
{




2 B = {γ | M{Kα2 B|P1(γ)} ≥ α} = φ.
So IKαB = φ, which means that B can not be iteratively
known at any state when α ∈ (0.5, 1].
Consider the case α = 0.5. Then Kα1 B = B and
Kα2 B = {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8}. Since





1, if γ ∈ B




2 B = {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11} and
Kα2 K
α
1 B = K
α



















2 B = {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}.


























n Kα1 B for all n ≥ 1. Thus IKαB = B,
meaning that B is iteratively known with certainty 0.5 at
states γ4, γ5, γ6 and γ7.
Consider C = {γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}. Similarly, IKαC =
φ for all α ∈ (0.5, 1] and IKαC = C when α = 0.5.
3.3 Mutually known with some certainty
An event A is mutually known with certainty α if both
players α-know it, both α-know that both α-know it, and
so on. Formally, define a “both α-know” operator as fol-




Definition 3.6. Event A is mutually known with certainty
α at γ if
γ ∈ MKαA ≡ ∩n≥1 [Kα∗ ]n A
≡ Kα∗A ∩Kα∗Kα∗A ∩Kα∗Kα∗Kα∗A ∩ · · · (6)
Proposition 3.4. For any α, β ∈ (0, 1] and A,B ∈ L,
(1) if A ∈ Q1 ∧Q2, then MK1A = A;
(2) if α ≥ β > 0, then MKαA ⊆ MKβA;
(3) if A ⊆ B, then MKαA ⊆ MKαB.
Proof. (1) Since A ∈ Q1 ∧ Q2, it follows from Propo-
sition 3.1 that K1i A = A for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus,




A = A for n = 1, 2, . . . Therefore,
MK1A = A.
(2) If α ≥ β, it follows from Proposition 3.1 that for
any A ⊆ B and i ∈ {1, 2}, Kαi A ⊆ Kβi B and Kαi A ⊆
Kαi B, thus K
α
∗A ⊆ Kβ∗A. Furthermore, Kα∗Kα∗A ⊆












n = 1, 2 . . ., thus MKαE ⊆ MKβA.
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(3) If A ⊆ B, it follows from Proposition 3.1 that
Kαi A ⊆ Kαi B for all i ∈ {1, 2} and α ∈ (0, 1]. Then
Kα∗A ⊆ Kα∗B and [Kα∗ ]n A ⊆ [Kα∗ ]n B for any n =
1, 2, . . ., thus, CKαA ⊆ CKαB.
Let MKα(γ) be the set of events which are mutu-
ally known with certainty α at γ. Then MKα(γ) =
{A | γ ∈ MKαA}.
Proposition 3.5. For any γ ∈ Γ and α ∈ (0, 1],
(1) if A ∈ MKα(γ) and A ⊆ B, then B ∈ MKα(γ);
(2) if α ≥ β > 0 then MKα(γ) ⊆ MKβ(γ).
Proof. Since A ∈ MKα(γ) then γ ∈ MKαA. Since A ⊆
B, it follows from Proposition 3.4 that MKαA ⊆ MKαB,
which implies that γ ∈ MKαB and B ∈ MKα(γ).
(2) For any C ∈ MKα(γ), we have γ ∈ MKαC. Since
α ≥ β, it follows from Proposition 3.4 that MKαC ⊆
MKβC. Thus, γ ∈ MKβC and C ∈ MKβ(γ). Finally,
MKα(γ) ⊆ MKβ(γ).
Proposition 3.6. For all events A ∈ L and α ∈ (0, 1], we
have MKαA ⊆ IKαA.
Proof. Since for any A ∈ L, α ∈ (0, 1] and i ∈ {1, 2},
we have Kα∗A = K
α
1 A∩Kα2 A ⊆ Kαi A. Thus, Kα∗Kα∗A =
Kα1 K
α








A ⊆ [Kα1 Kα2 ]n A ∩ [Kα2 Kα1 ]n A
for all n ≥ 1. Thus
MKαA ≡ ∩n≥1 [Kα∗ ]n A ⊆ IKα1 A ∩ IKα2 A ≡ IKαA.
The proposition is proved.
Example 3.3. Consider the principal-agent model as de-
scribed in Example 3.1 and 3.2, and the events B =
{γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7} and C = {γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}. When α ∈
(0.5, 1], Kα1 B = {γ | M{A′|P1(γ)} ≥ α} = B and
Kα2 B = {γ | M{A′|P2(γ)} ≥ α} = {γ4, γ5, γ6}. Thus
Kα∗B = K
α
1 B ∩ Kα2 B = {γ4, γ5, γ6} = Kα2 B. Since
Kα1 K
α









and MKαB = φ, which means that B can’t be mutually
known at any state when α ∈ (0.5, 1].
Consider the case α = 0.5. Then Kα1 B = B and
Kα2 B = {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8}. Thus Kα∗B = B. So
[Kα∗ ]
n
B = B for any n ≥ 1, and MKαB = B, which
means that B is mutually known with certainty 0.5 at
states γ4, γ5, γ6 and γ7.
Similarly, MKαC = φ for all α ∈ (0.5, 1] and
MKαC = C when α = 0.5.
4 An Application in Principal-Agent Model
In this section, an application is given to show that how
the approximate common knowledge in an uncertain sense
can be applied to improve the behavior of an economic
model while requiring lower certainty.
The basic principal-agent model developed by Laf-
font [4] is investigated. Consider a consumer or a firm
(the principal) who wants to delegate a task of producing
q unit goods to an agent. The production cost of the agent
is divided into two parts, fixed cost F and marginal cost
γ. Assume that γ belongs to the set Γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . , γ11}
and (Γ,L,M) is the uncertainty space described in Exam-
ple 3.2. The information partitionQ1 andQ2 are given as
in Example 3.1. The economic variables of the problem
are the quantity produced q and the transfer t to the agent.
Let A be the set of feasible allocations. Formally, A =
{(q, t) : Γ → <+ × <}, where <+ = {x ∈ < | x > 0}.
Since Γ has finite elements, then A can be rewritten as
A = {(q1, t1), (q2, t2), . . . , (q11, t11) |
qi ∈ <+, ti ∈ <, i = 1, 2, . . . , 11}.
Since the agent chooses the production level according to
what s/he observes about the marginal cost, therefore, q
and t are Q2-measurable functions. Furthermore, it fol-
lows from
Q2 = {{γ1}, {γ2, γ3}, {γ4, γ5, γ6}, {γ7, γ8},
{γ9, γ10, γ11}}
that q2 = q3, q4 = q5 = q6, q7 = q8 and q9 = q10 = q11.
Similarly, t2 = t3, t4 = t5 = t6, t7 = t8 and t9 = t10 =
t11.
For each (qi, ti), the utility of the agent under state
γ is denoted by U(qi, ti, γ). Thus U(qi, ti, γ) is an un-
certain variable defined on (Γ,L,M). Let A1 = {γ1},
A2 = {γ2, γ3}, A4 = {γ4, γ5, γ6}, A7 = {γ7, γ8} and
A9 = {γ9, γ10, γ11} denote the events those can be ob-
served by the agent. On learning the event Ai and choos-
ing the item (q, t), the agent can calculate the conditional
expected value by following Definition 2.7 as
U(q, t|Ai) = E[U(q, t, γ)|γ ∈ Ai].
In this application, the effectiveness of the approxi-
mate common knowledge applied to the principal-agent
problem can be checked by considering the incentive com-
patibility constraints. In order to make a comparation,
we first explore the case when common knowledge is re-
quired. When the true state is contained in {γ1, γ2, γ3},
then {γ1, γ2, γ3} is a common knowledge according to
Example 3.1. The contract for the agent to choose can
be restricted to
A|{γ1,γ2,γ3}
= {(q1, t1), (q2, t2) | qi ∈ <+, ti ∈ <, i = 1, 2}(7)
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satisfying the following incentive compatibility con-
straints
U(q1, t1|A1) ≥ U(q2, t2|A1), (8)
U(q2, t2|A2) ≥ U(q1, t1|A2). (9)
Similarly, when the true state belongs to
{γ4, γ5, . . . , γ11}, the contract can be designed re-
stricting to
A|{γ4,γ5,...,γ11} = {(q4, t4), (q7, t7), (q9, t9) |
qi ∈ <+, ti ∈ <, i = 4, 7, 9} (10)
satisfying the following incentive compatibility con-
straints
U(q4, t4|A4) ≥ U(qi, ti|A4), ∀i ∈ {7, 9}, (11)
U(q7, t7|A7) ≥ U(qj , tj |A7), ∀j ∈ {4, 9}, (12)
U(q9, t9|A9) ≥ U(qk, tk|A9), ∀k ∈ {4, 7}. (13)
Let ACK(γ) denote the set of all feasible contracts satis-





{(q1, t1), (q2, t2) |
satisfying (7), (8) and (9)},
if γ ∈ {γ1, γ2, γ3}
{(q4, t4), (q7, t7), (q9, t9) |
satisfying (10), (11), (12), (13)},
if γ ∈ {γ4, γ5, . . . , γ11}.
Now, consider the revised model with approximate
common knowledge. According to Example 3.2 and 3.3,
the events {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7} and {γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11} are ap-
proximate common knowledge with certainty 0.5 (iter-
atively known with certainty 0.5 as well as mutually
known with certainty 0.5). When the true state belongs
to {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7}, the event {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7} can be ob-
served by the principal. Then s/he can design the contract
restricting to the form
A|{γ4,γ5,γ6,γ7} =
{(q4, t4), (q7, t7)) | qi ∈ <+, ti ∈ <, i = 4, 7}.(14)
If the principal provides the contract A|{γ4,γ5,γ6,γ7},
then the agent can conclude that the true state is contained
in {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7}. On observing the event {γ7, γ8}, the
agent can learn the true state γ7. Otherwise, s/he can de-
duce that the true is contained in A4. Thus the contract
should satisfy the following incentive compatibility con-
straints
U(q4, t4|A4) ≥ U(q7, t7|A4), (15)
U(q7, t7|γ7) ≥ U(q4, t4|γ7). (16)
Similarly, when the true state belongs to
{γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}, the contract can be designed re-
stricting to
A|{γ8,γ9,γ10,γ11} = {(q7, t7), (q9, t9) | (17)
qi ∈ <+, ti ∈ <, i = 7, 9}, (18)
with the following incentive compatibility constraints
U(q8, t8|γ8) ≥ U(q9, t9|γ8), (19)
U(q9, t9|A9) ≥ U(q8, t8|A9). (20)
The timing of the contracting game can be depicted as
follows:
(1) the principal and the agent learn the true state accord-
ing to what they observe;
(2) the principal offers a contract with restriction accord-
ing to what s/he learns;
(3) the agent accepts or refuses the contract;
(4) the contract is executed.
LetAM IK(γ) denote the set of feasible contracts sat-





{(q1, t1), (q2, t2) | satisfying (7), (8) and (9)},
if γ ∈ {γ1, γ2, γ3}
{(q4, t4), (q7, t7) | satisfying (14), (15) and (16)},
if γ ∈ {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7}
{(q8, t8), (q9, t9) | satisfying (17), (19) and (20)},
if γ ∈ {γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}.
It is obviously that ACK(γ) = AM IK(γ) for each
γ ∈ {γ1, γ2, γ3}. When γ ∈ {γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7}, there
are 6 incentive compatibility constraints in ACK(γ), i.e.,
(11), (12) and (13), while 2 incentive compatibility con-
straints, (15) and (16), in AM IK(γ), and (15) is con-
tained in (11). Intuitively, AM IK(γ) is much larger
than ACK(γ). Especially, when γ7 approaches to γ8,
U(qi, ti|γ7) = U(qi, ti|γ8) = U(qi, ti|A7) for each i =
7, 8, then ACK(γ) ⊂ AM IK(γ).
When γ ∈ {γ8, γ9, γ10, γ11}, we have a similar re-
sult. Thus the principal can design a more effective
contract while applying approximate common knowledge
with lower certainty.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes that how an uncertain event, which is
not common knowledge, can be analyzed as an approxi-
mate common knowledge with some certainty. Iteratively
known and mutually known with some certainty are two
different concepts for approximate common knowledge.
Their properties and relations are also investigated in this
paper. Since the probability measure and the credibility
measure are special kinds of uncertain measure, thus, our
work can be considered as an extension to the existing lit-
eratures about approximate common knowledge.
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In the principal-agent model, with this approximate
common knowledge in mind, the principal can construct
a more effective contract with an agent. Thus approxi-
mate common knowledge in the uncertain environment is
of great value to analyzing economic problems and this
will be studied in our further work.
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